SOME COMMON CONFUSIONS ABOUT CONSENT IN
RAPE CASES
Peter Westen
ABSTRACT:
Consent to sex matters because it can transform
coitus from being among the most heinous of criminal offenses
into sex that is of no concern at all to the criminal law.
Unfortunately, the normative task of making the law of rape more
just is commonly impaired by conceptual confusion about what
“consent” means. Consent is both a single concept in law and a
multitude of opposing and cross-cutting conceptions of which
courts and commentators tend to be only dimly aware. Thus,
consent can be a mental state on a woman’s part, an expression by
her, or both; it can consist of facts about a woman’s mental state
or expressive conduct that do not necessarily constitute a defense
to rape or consist only such facts as do constitute a defense to rape;
and it can consist of facts about a woman’s mental state or
expressive conduct or a legal fiction of such facts. In so far as we
are unaware of the ways in which this conceptual framework
structures the way we think about consent, we risk confusing
ourselves and others in undertaking to make the law of rape more
just. Some examples are (1) confusion as to whether the defense
of consent ought to be deemed to consist of a mental state on a
woman’s part or an expression; (2) confusion about the
relationship between consent to sexual intercourse and resistance
to it; and (3) confusion about the relationship between force and
non-consent.
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SOME COMMON CONFUSIONS REGARDING CONSENT
Consent arises in various forms in law. It arises in the law
of contracts in the form of promises. It arises in property law in
the form of assignments of interests. And it arises in torts and
criminal law as defenses to wrongdoing. These are all instances
of “consent,” and, as such, they share things in common. But they
also contain differences--differences that can be framed in
Hohfeldian terms:
# A legal promise by a person, Bill, to another, Susan,
creates a Hohfeldian “right” in Susan, that is, it creates in Bill an
enforceable “duty” to Susan to act in a certain way.
# A legal assignment of a property interest by Bill to
Susan creates a Hohfeldian “power” in Susan, that is, it vests
Susan as possessor of the interest with the authority to change the
legal relationships of others.
# In contrast, when a person, Bill, legally consents to
conduct by another, Susan, that would otherwise constitute a tort
or crime by Susan against Bill, Bill’s consent creates a Hohfeldian
“privilege” in Susan. Susan’s privilege is not a right that Bill
behave in a certain way in the future. Nor is it a power by which
Susan may change the legal relationships of others. Rather, the
privilege which Bill’s consent creates in Susan in torts and
criminal law is the negation of a Hohfeldian duty that Susan would
otherwise have to Bill: Bill’s consent negates a legally enforceable
obligation that Susan would otherwise have to Susan to refrain
from engaging in the conduct.1
If I were able, I would study consent in all its forms.
However, because consent in contracts and property differs
significantly from consent in criminal law and torts, and because
my expertise is confined to criminal law, I shall confine myself to
addressing the privilege of consent in criminal cases and,
1

See generally Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions
(Yale University Press: New Haven, 1919).
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specifically, in the area of criminal law in which it is most often
litigated, i.e., rape cases.
As students of the law of rape, we care about the defense of
consent because of the normative function it performs. Consent
possesses what Heidi Hurd calls the normative “magic” to
transform sexual intercourse from being conduct that is second
only to murder in its heinousness into being conduct that is
criminally innocuous.2 Consent matters because to locate consent
with respect to sexual intercourse is to locate the normative
boundary between criminal rape and non-criminal sex.
Unfortunately, when commentators and lawmakers
undertake the normative task of distinguishing criminal rape and
non-criminal sex, they sometimes stumble over something that is
analytically anterior to their normative inquiry. They unwittingly
stumble over what I call the “conceptual apparatus of consent” –
that is, they unwittingly fail to negotiate the categories of thought
by which we reason about consent. They mistakenly think of
consent as solely a generic concept, when, in reality, the concept of
consent in our popular and legal culture also encompasses three
pairs of contrasting and cross-cutting conceptions of consent, each
constituted by its own normative presuppositions. By overlooking
the existence of these competing conceptions of consent, and by
conflating the nature or normative presuppositions of one
conception of consent with another, they fail to think and speak
clearly about how they mean to be distinguishing rape from sex.
My aim in this essay is analytical. Without taking a
position myself on what distinguishes rape from sex, I hope to
sharpen the tools of thought with which it is done. I will proceed
in three parts: In part I, I will try to identify the three pairs of
contrasting conceptions of consent that underlie debates about
consent. In part II, I will examine the failure of commentators and
lawmakers to understand the normative presuppositions of one of
those pairs of contrasting conceptions, namely, that between

2

Heidi Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent,” Legal Theory, vol. 2, no.
2, pp.121-46 (1996).
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“consent” as subjective state of mind and “consent” as an
objective expression. And in part III, I will examine two
confusions that I believe result from conflating another pair of
contrasting conceptions, namely, the contrast between “consent” as
an empirical fact and “consent” as a legal judgment.
I. THREE PAIRS OF COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF CONSENT
When we speak of “consent” as a defense to rape, we use a
term that simultaneously refers to both a single generic concept
and a multitude of specific conceptions (although we are not
always clear either to ourselves or others as to which specific
conception we have in mind). Generically, to “consent” to sexual
intercourse in law is to acquiesce to it in some way, whether by
virtue of doing so subjectively, objectively, or as a matter of law.
Specifically, to “consent” to sexual intercourse in law is to
acquiesce to it in one or more particular ways. The particular ways
in which one consents to sexual intercourse range across three
pairs of contrasting and cross-cutting conceptions of acquiescence.
A. “Factual” Consent versus “Legal” Consent
To say in law that a woman “consents” to sexual
intercourse is ambiguous because “consent” has two contrasting
meanings in law. The contrast is between a woman’s factually
acquiescing to sexual intercourse and her legally acquiescing to it.
A woman “factually” consents to sexual intercourse when, whether
in mind or expression, she actually chooses sexual intercourse as
that which she unconditionally desires for herself, as that which
she prefers for herself under the circumstances in which she
believes herself to be, or as that about which she is sufficiently
indifferent to it as to be willing to leave its occurrence to others -without its necessarily being the case, however, that her choice
itself constitutes a defense to rape. In contrast, a woman “legally”
consents to sexual intercourse when she does or experiences
anything -- including but not limited to her actually choosing of
sexual intercourse for herself -- under such conditions as the
jurisdiction at hand deems sufficient for her conduct or experience
to constitute a defense to rape.
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To illustrate the difference between factual and legal
consent, consider the contrasting ways in which jurisdictions talk
about the offense of statutory rape. Some jurisdictions say of
underage girls that “their consent is no defense.”
Other
jurisdictions say of them that being underage, they are “too young
to consent.” The legal effect of both statements is identical, but the
two usages of “consent” are mutually exclusive. When a
jurisdiction says that an underage girl’s “consent” is “no defense”
to statutory rape, the jurisdiction is using “consent” factually: the
jurisdiction is referring to the girl’s having actually chosen sexual
intercourse for herself, without connoting, however, that the girls’
choice itself constitutes a defense to statutory rape. (Indeed, if the
jurisdiction were using “consent” to refer to an actual choice of
sexual intercourse that itself constituted a defense to statutory rape,
the jurisdiction would be contradicting itself in stating that the
girl’s consent is “no defense” to statutory rape.) In contrast, when
a jurisdiction says that underage girls are “too young to consent,”
the jurisdiction does not claim that underage girls are too young to
desire sexual intercourse, or too young to choose it as that which
they prefer under the circumstances, or even too young to be
sufficiently indifferent as to be willing to leave its occurrence to
others. Rather, the jurisdiction means that regardless of how they
go about choosing sexual intercourse for themselves, underage
girls lack the competence that the jurisdictions deem necessary for
their choices to themselves constitute a defense to statutory rape.
B. “Attitudinal” Consent versus “Expressive” Consent
In addition to the foregoing contrast between factual and
legal consent, the generic concept of consent also ranges over a
second pair of contrasting conceptions of consent. The second
pair is based on contrasting ways in which a woman can actually
choose sexual intercourse for herself. The contrast is between a
woman’s subjectively choosing sexual intercourse and her
objectively doing so. Thus, when commentators and lawmakers
say that a woman has “consented” to sexual intercourse, they
sometimes mean to refer to something the woman subjectively
experienced on a first-person basis. They are referring to the
mental or emotional attitude on her part of having actually chosen
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sexual intercourse for herself. The Canadian rape statute is an
example. In making it an offense for a person to have sexual
intercourse with another without the latter’s “consent,” the
Canadian Parliament defines “consent” as a choice the latter
person subjectively experiences--as opposed to a choice she
objectively manifests.3
At other times, however, when commentators and
lawmakers refer to a woman’s “consent” to sexual intercourse,
they are referring not to something she feels, but to something she
does. They are referring not to a subjective experience of choice,
but to an objective expression of choice. Thus, in making it an
offense for an actor to have sexual intercourse with another person
without the latter’s “consent,” the Minnesota legislature defines
“consent” as consisting of “words or overt actions by a person . . .
indicating . . . agreement to have sexual intercourse.”4
C. “Actual” Consent versus “Imputed” Consent
Finally, the generic concept of consent ranges over still a
third pair of contrasting conceptions of consent. The third pair
consists of the contrast between instances of the kinds of actual
consent, on the one hand, and legal fictions of such actual consent,
on the other. Thus, when commentators and lawmakers say that a
woman has “consented” to sexual intercourse, they sometimes
mean to refer to one or more of the kind of actual choices of sexual
intercourse that we have been discussing thus far. That is, they
mean that she actually chose sexual intercourse for herself,
regardless of whether she did so attitudinally or expressively (or
both), and regardless of whether she did so factually(and, hence,
in a way that does not itself constitute a defense to rape) or legally
(and, hence, under such of competence, knowledge, and freedom
that the jurisdiction at hand deems sufficient to justify leaving the
choice to her).

3

See Regina v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Supreme Court of
Canada)(construing Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, c. C-46, § 265.1(a)).
4
Minnesota Statutes § 609.341(4)(2000).
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At other times, however, when commentators and
lawmakers say that a woman has “consented” to sexual
intercourse, they mean quite the opposite. They mean that
although the woman did not actually choose sexual intercourse for
herself, the law will treat her as if she did and, moreover, as if she
did so under such conditions of competence, knowledge, and
freedom as to entitle her partner to a defense to rape. That is, they
mean that the law imputes such an actual choice to her, despite her
having neither experienced nor manifested it. A good example is
the so-called “marital rape exemption,” which is still in effect
some jurisdictions, according to which a woman by virtue of
marrying is deemed to consent to future sexual relations to which
her husband may subject her. Another example is the rule in some
jurisdictions to the effect that a woman who actually chooses to
commence to have sexual intercourse and who does so under
appropriate conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom is
deemed to continue to consent throughout its duration, regardless
of the fact that she emphatically changes her mind in the very
midst of it.
D. Relationships between Contrasting Conceptions of Consent
Each of these six conceptions of consent has its own
distinct reference. However, events can arise to which the
contrasting conceptions of a pair both apply. Thus, suppose that a
woman wholeheartedly and voluntarily engages in sexual
intercourse with her husband within a jurisdiction that adheres to
the marital rape exemption. The jurisdiction could simultaneously
say that she “actually” consented by choosing sexual intercourse
for herself, and that she “imputedly” consented by virtue of
marrying her husband.
Events can arise in which contrasting conceptions of
“attitudinal” and “expressive” consent also apply. But such events
must arise in an inter-jurisdictional context because no single
jurisdiction can simultaneously define consent as an attitude as
opposed to an expression and as an expression as opposed to an
attitude. Suppose, therefore, that an inter-jurisdictional case arises
between Canada, which defines consent as a subjective attitude,
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and Minnesota, which defines consent as an objective expression.
Suppose further that the case involves a woman who, in mind as
well as word and deed, wholeheartedly and voluntarily chooses to
engage in sexual intercourse with her boyfriend. Both jurisdictions
would say that she “consented” for purposes of the law of rape,
though they would mean different things by it. Canada would
mean that she subjectively consented in her mind, while Minnesota
would mean that she objectively consented in word and deed.
The same is true of the contrasting conceptions of “factual”
and “legal” consent. To illustrate, consider the contrasting ways in
which Canadian and English statutes defined consent in the 1970s.
Both statutes made it an offense for a person to have sexual
intercourse with a woman without the latter’s “consent;” both
statutes defined a woman’s consent as an actual rather than
imputed choice of sexual intercourse on her part; and both statutes
defined the choice as attitudinal rather than expressive.5 But the
statutes differed in one respect: the Canadian statute used
“consent” factually, while the English statute used “consent”
legally:
Canadian Criminal Code Section 1436
A male person commits rape when he has sexual
intercourse with a female person who is not his wife,
(a) without her consent, or
(b) with her consent if the consent
(i) is extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm,
(ii) is obtained by impersonating her husband, or

5

See Regina v. Abraham, (1977) 30 C.C.C. (2d) 332 (quoting Regina
v. Donovan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498, 504; R v. R, [1992] 1 AC 599, [1991] 4 All ER
481, [1991] 3 WLR 767; Regina v. Olugboja, [1982] 1 Q.B. 320, 332.
6
Criminal Code, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, c. C-34, § 143
(repealed 1980-81).
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(iii) is obtained by false and fraudulent
representations as to the nature and quality of the act.
English Sexual Offences Act7
[A] man commits rape if he has unlawful sexual
intercourse with a woman who at the time of the
intercourse does not consent to it . . . .
Now suppose that an inter-jurisdictional instance arose in
which a woman subjectively chose to engage in sexual intercourse
under conditions that both Canada and England regarded as
sufficient to justify leaving the choice to her and, hence, to entitle
her partner to a defense to rape. How would the two jurisdictions
talk about a joint decision to exonerate the woman’s partner of any
charge of rape? England would say, the woman “consented”-- and
that would be all England would have to say, because England uses
“consent” to refer to actual choices that occur under such
conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom as suffice, in
its judgment, to themselves constitute defenses to rape. In
contrast, Canada would also say, the woman “consented.” But that
would not be all Canada would have to say, because Canada uses
“consent” more narrowly than England. Canada uses consent in a
factual sense to refer to actual choices that, though necessary to
constitute defenses to rape, are not sufficient. “Consent” does not
suffice by itself in Canada to constitute a defense, because given
the way Canada uses “consent,” a woman may “consent” and yet
have been induced to do so by the kinds of threats or frauds that
preclude her consent from constituting a defense. Accordingly, to
account for its decision, Canada would have to say something that
would be redundant in England, such as that the woman “validly”
or “lawfully” or “voluntarily” consented.

7

English Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, § 1(1).
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E. Cross-cutting Relationships Among Pairs of Conceptions
We have thus far analyzed the six conceptions of consent
by examining events to which contrasting conceptions of a pair can
both apply. We will now examine the extent to which pairs of
conceptions (or members of them) cross-cut one another.
The most complete cross-cutting among pairs occurs with
respect to the relationship between actual consent (from the
actual/imputed pair) and the pair consisting of attitudinal and
expressive consent. Every instance of actual consent is an instance
of a subjective and/or objective choosing of sexual intercourse;
and, hence, every instance of actual consent is also an instance of
attitudinal consent, expressive consent, or both. By the same token,
every instance of attitudinal or expressive consent is an instance of
actual consent.
The cross-cutting relationship between imputed consent
(from the actual/imputed pair) and legal consent (from the
factual/legal pair) is less complete. Every instance of imputed
consent is also an instance of legal consent because imputed
consent is a legal fiction, the purpose of which is to treat certain
conduct or experiences on a woman’s part as if they were identical
to the kinds of instances of actual consent on her part that
constitute defenses to rape. However, the converse is not the case.
Not all instances of legal consent are also instances of imputed
consent. On the contrary, as we shall see in a moment, most
instances of legal consent consist of a subset for we have not yet
coined a term: they consist of that subset of legal consent of which
imputed consent is a legal fiction of.
The most complex cross-cutting relationships are between
the pair that consists of factual and legal consent, on the one hand,
and actual consent, on the other. All instances of factual consent,
whether they are attitudinal or expressive in nature, are also
instances of actual consent because they all consist of instances in
which people subjectively or objectively choose sexual intercourse
for themselves. However, instances of legal consent are only
sometimes instances of actual consent. Legal consent consists of
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two subsets: imputed consent; and what I call “prescriptive
consent.” “Prescriptive consent,” whether it is attitudinal or
expressive in nature, is that of which imputed consent is a fiction –
namely, instances of actual consent, whether attitudinal or
expressive, that occur under such conditions of competence,
knowledge, and freedom as suffice for the choices to themselves
constitute defenses to rape.
As illustrations of prescriptive consent, recall the English
and Minnesota rape statutes. Both statutes make it an offense to
have sexual intercourse with a person without the latter’s
“consent.” Both use “consent” in a legal rather than a factual
sense, because in contrast to Canada, the English and Minnesota
statutes both regard “consent” as something that, if it obtains,
suffices in itself to constitute a defense to rape. Yet because
neither statute imputes consent to women who have sexual
intercourse, both define “consent” prescriptively. Thus, England
defines a woman’s consent as consisting of her subjectively
choosing sexual intercourse under conditions of competence,
knowledge, and freedom sufficient in England’s judgment to
justify leaving the choice to her. Minnesota defines a woman’s
consent as consisting of her expressing that she is choosing sexual
intercourse under conditions sufficient in Minnesota’s judgment to
justify leaving the expressed choice to her.
II. CONFUSING THE NORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF
ATTITUDINAL VERSUS EXPRESSIVE CONSENT
Consent is one of a handful of concepts (along with
freedom, equality, democracy, etc.) by which we organize our
normative thinking. These concepts work because they are
simultaneously capable of being both broadly generic and highly
specific. Consent is broadly generic because it applies wherever
any person in any way acquiesces to the project of another; yet
consent is also specific because it also takes the form of
normatively contrasting conceptions. Unfortunately, because we
perceive this conceptual structure only darkly, we conflate one
contrasting conception of consent with another, confusing
ourselves and others in our normative thinking about rape cases.
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A good example, I think, is the notorious “condom”
decision a few years ago by a grand jury in Austin, Texas, to
dismiss a rape charge against an armed burglar broke into a
woman’s apartment and subjected her to sexual intercourse at
knifepoint. The grand jury reasoned that by virtue of agreeing to
submit to the man if he were willing to put on a condom, the
woman “consented” to the sex.
Women’s groups, being
understandably outraged, condemned the grand jury for being
morally perverse. Now it is possible that the grand jury was,
indeed, a morally perverse body. But it seems unlikely. Austin,
with its woman city manager and woman police chief, was a liberal
city with one of the most sophisticated sexual assault programs in
the country. And the district attorney later said that he regarded
the grand jury as “actually . . . a pretty good one.”8 It is more
likely that, rather than being morally perverse, the grand jury was
simply confused -- confused by the kind of “consent” it was being
asked to examine. In asking the grand jury to determine whether
the woman consented, the prosecutor was using “consent” in the
same legal sense in which the aforementioned English rape statute
uses “consent” -- namely, to ask the grand jury to determine
whether the woman chose sexual intercourse under conditions that,
in the eyes of the state, justified leaving the decision to her. In
contrast, the grand jury may have understood the prosecutor to be
using “consent” in the same factual sense in which the
aforementioned Canadian statute uses “consent” -- namely, to ask
whether the woman chose sexual intercourse as that which she
preferred for herself under the circumstances in which she believed
herself to be, even if her choice was the product of “threats or fear
of bodily harm.”9 Indeed, if the latter had been what the
prosecutor had asked, the grand jury would have been right to say
the woman “consented,” because the woman most certainly did
consent in that respect, both in mind as well as word.

8

Houston Chronicle, 10 Oct. 10, 1992, p. 30; New York Times, 25 Oct.
25, 1992, p. 18; Detroit Free Press, 28 Oct. 1992, p. 3A.
9
Criminal Code, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, c. C-34, § 143
(repealed 1980-81).
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I will focus here on another kind of normative confusion,
namely, the difficulty that arises when commentators and
lawmakers either overlook or misunderstand the normative
significance of defining consent for purposes of the law of rape as
attitude as opposed to an expression. We have seen that, as among
jurisdictions in which a woman’s actual consent is a defense to
rape, some jurisdictions define such actual consent as an attitude
on her part (e.g., Canada, England), while other jurisdictions define
it as an expression (e.g., Minnesota). With respect to most
jurisdictions, however, it is impossible to say whether they choose
to define actual consent in attitudinal as opposed to expressive
terms (or vice versa) because when one looks, one finds only
silence -- silence that implies that the jurisdictions are either
oblivious to the normative differences between attitudinal and
expressive consent or dismissive of them.
With respect to commentators, the problem is the opposite.
Rather than overlooking the distinction between attitudinal and
expressive consent, commentators focus on it intently.
Some
commentators take the position that from a normative standpoint,
prescriptive consent is most emphatically a subjective choice, and
not an objective expression of choice, and, hence, the law of rape
ought to treat it as such.10 In contrast, other commentators argue
that from a normative standpoint, consent is most emphatically a
speech act and not a subjective state of mind, and the law of rape
ought to treat it as such.11 I believe that this dispute is

10

See Heidi Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent,”p. 126 (“one must
conclude that consent is equivalent not to desire as such, but to the execution of
a desire, namely, to choice”). Accord Larry Alexander, “The Moral Magic of
Consent (II), Legal Theory, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 165-74, at 166 (1996)(I agree [with
Hurd] . . . that consent . . . must be the exercise of will and, thus, a subjective
mental state. . . .”).
11
See, e.g., Nathan Brett, “Commentary,” in Anne Bayefsky (ed),
Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice, pp. 253-257, at 257 (Edmonton, Canada:
Academic Print, 1988)(embracing a “performative account of consent”); Joan
McGregor, “Force, Consent, and the Reasonable Woman,” in Jules Coleman and
Allen Buchanan (eds), In Harm’s Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1994), pp. 231-54, at 242 (“Consent is
performative, it is something that an agent does”); Emily Sherwin, “Infelicitous

14

Westen

[April

misconceived, because it rests upon a fallacious assumption. It
rests on the fallacy that there is a single, normatively correct
answer to the question, “What is the criminal defense of consent to
sexual intercourse -- an attitude or an act?” For in reality, there are
at least two normatively-correct answers to the question,
depending upon what jurisdictions regard as the purposes of
punishment with respect to rape. Within jurisdictions that regard
“rape” as a crime analogous to attempted murder, the punishment
for which ought solely to be a function of an actor’s
blameworthiness, consent ought to be defined as an objective
expression on a woman’s part. In contrast, within jurisdictions that
regard “rape” as a crime analogous to murder, the punishment for
which ought not solely to be a function of an actor’s
blameworthiness but ought also to reflect resulting harm, consent
ought to be defined as a subjective attitude on a woman’s part.
To illustrate the relationship between a jurisdiction’s
definition of “consent” and its purposes in punishing offenders,
suppose that jurisdiction makes it an offense for a person “to have
sexual intercourse with a woman either without her consent or with
her consent if she consents in fear of bodily harm.” Suppose
further that courts within the jurisdiction have not yet decided
Sex,” Legal Theory, vol. 2, pp. 209-31. at. 209 (1996)(“Consent is a social act .
. . an act designed for the expression of a subjective choice”); Heidi Malm, “The
Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law of Rape,”Legal
Theory, vol. 2, pp. 147-64, p. 147 (1996)(“I think there are strong pragmatic
reasons for thinking that ‘consent’ is best defined as the signification of a
particular mental state, rather than as the mental state itself”); Lucinda
Vandervort, “Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea,”
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, vol. 2, no. 2, 1987-88, pp. 233-309.
at 267 (citing Austin):
The social act of consent consists of communication to
another person, by means of verbal or nonverbal behaviour, of
permission to perform one or more acts which that person would
otherwise have a legal or non-legal obligation not perform.
Consenting, like promising, is thus performative.
Alan Wertheimer, “What Is Consent? And Is It Important,” Buffalo
Criminal Law Review, vol. 3, pp. 557-583., at 557 (1999)(“I shall argue [that] . .
. consent is best understood as a performative or action, not as a subjective
phenomenon”).
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whether the phrase “consenting in fear of bodily harm” refers to an
objective act of acquiescing in fear of bodily harm or a subjective
attitude of acquiescing in fear of bodily harm. Suppose, finally,
that the two following cases arise, the first of which involves a
woman who acquiesces in word but not in mind, the second of
which involves a woman who consents in mind but not in word.
Terrorized Susan (In Word but not in Mind)12
Susan lives with an abusive boyfriend who
regularly beats Susan with violence that has been
escalating. On the day in question, the boyfriend begins
to beat Susan about the face, but then uncustomarily stops
and, while holding her by the hair, tells her she has a
“choice.” “You can take the beating you deserve. Or you
can avoid it by going outside, accosting a passerby, and
doing your best to get him in the house and giving him
oral sex. And, remember, I’ll be watching, and if I don’t
think you’re trying hard enough, I’ll give you a beating
you’ll never forget. Susan, after futile begging, does as
instructed: masking her fear, Susan cajoles a passerby
into entering her house; and while Susan is being watched
by her boyfriend from behind a door, she performs fellatio
on the passerby. The boyfriend and passerby are
thereafter both charged with rape, to which the passerby
says in his defense, “I realize now that Susan submitted
out of fear of bodily harm, and I feel terrible about it. But
I had no idea at the time. I thought she was just coming
on to me.”

12

Cf. People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630
(1985). For an account of the Burnham trial, see The San Diego Union-Tribune,
30 January 1986, p. B-17.
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Undercover Mark (In Mind but not in Word)13
Mark lives in a civil union with a former detective
who knows how to inflict torture without leaving any
marks. Mark’s partner tortures Mark until Mark submits
to a form of sexual intercourse that Mark finds degrading;
and, having forced Mark to submit, the former detective
announces that he intends to do the same thing the
following night. Mark immediately reports the assault to
the police, but they tell him that local juries tend not to
convict in such cases unless there is evidence of injuries
or a videotape. Hearing the word “videotape,” Mark
offers to go undercover by equipping the house with
surveillance equipment.
The prosecutor is initially
reluctant, but she eventually agrees when Mark assures
her that he will call for help if he wants it. When evening
comes, the former detective orders Mark to submit. Mark
cries and begs him not to force him to submit. But when
Mark sees his partner seize the equipment he used the
previous night to torture him, Mark tells his partner that
he’ll do anything rather than suffer such pain again.
Mark considers calling the police but decides instead to
go through with the sex, while pretending the entire time
to be terrified. Mark’s partner is charged with rape, to
which he says in his defense, “Yes, I admit that I thought
at the time that Mark was submitting for fear of bodily
harm, but I now know that he was faking and only
pretending to be in fear.”
“Terrorized Susan” and “Undercover Mark” will each be
decided differently, depending upon whether the courts of the
jurisdiction interpret the statutory term “consent” to be a subjective
attitude or an objective expression on a putative victim’s part. If
the courts hold consent to be an attitude, Susan’s abusive boyfriend
13

(1981).

Cf. New York v. Bink, 84 App. Div. 2d 607, 44 N.Y.S.2d 237
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and the unwitting passerby will both be guilty of rape (unless the
passerby has a separate defense of lack of mens rea), because
Susan did not freely acquiesce in her mind. At the same time,
Mark’s partner will be guilty not of rape but of attempted rape,
because although he thought Mark was acquiescing out of fear of
bodily harm, Mark was not in fear at all. In contrast, if consent is
held to be an expression, Susan’s boyfriend and Mark’s partner
will both be guilty of rape because Susan communicated to the
former and Mark communicated to the latter that each was terrified
of being beaten; at the same time, the passerby will not be guilty of
any offense of sexual assault because Susan successfully (albeit
disingenuously) communicated to the passerby that she was freely
acquiescing in their sexual intercourse.
To assess the normative force of the two interpretations,
let us consider the normative functions they respectively perform.
Defining consent as an expression serves two appropriate
normative functions in criminal law – one with respect to accused
actors, the other with respect to their putative victims. Defining
consent as an expression has the virtue of making an actor’s
criminal responsibility a function of what he is capable of inferring
his sexual partner’s desires to be under the circumstances. An
actor’s criminal responsibility ought to be a function of what he is
capable of inferring regarding the interests of others, because to
blame a person is to attribute certain motivations to him regarding
the interests of others (i.e., hatred, callousness, indifference or
inadvertence). To punish a person for what he could not have
known regarding his victim’s desires (e.g., the passerby in Susan’s
case) is to attribute motivations of hatred or callousness, disregard,
or carelessness to him that he did not possess. Defining consent as
an expression also has the virtue of making an actor’s criminal
responsibility a function of his victim suffering a certain harm --namely, the dignitary harm that an actor inflicts upon a sexual
partner by subjecting her to sexual intercourse that he infers or
ought to infer she does not desire. An actor like the passerby in
Susan’s case does not inflict that dignitary harm if his sexual
partner’s expressions reasonably lead him to believe that he is
acting in accord with her wishes. He inflicts this dignitary harm
upon her only if he subjects her to sexual intercourse in the
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absence of expressions that reasonably lead him to believe that he
is acting in accord with her desires.
Based on the foregoing analysis of consent-as-expression,
the practice of defining consent as an attitude seems normatively
deficient because it fails to base an actor’s blameworthiness upon
what he is capable of inferring his partner’s interests to be and
upon whether he inflicts dignitary harm on her. And, indeed,
standing alone, the practice of defining consent as an attitude is
deficient because it not only acquits Mark’s partner (who, while
acting with a guilty mind, inflicted a dignitary harm upon Mark)
but it convicts Susan’s passerby. In reality, however, definitions of
attitudinal consent do not stand alone, at least not in cases
involving sexual intercourse by means of force. Rather, they are
invariably accompanied by two other rules that negate the
normative deficiencies described above: first, they are buttressed
by prohibitions of attempted rape of which Mark’s partner would
be guilty; and second, they are accompanied by rules requiring
mens rea under which the passerby would be acquitted. The
combination causes consent-as-attitude to reproduce much the
same effect as consent-as-expression.
Why, then, would a jurisdiction choose to define consent as
an attitude? The answer is that, although defining consent as an
attitude produces much the same effect as defining it as an
expression, it does not produce the identical effect. The two
approaches to consent differ in one significant respect: by defining
consent as an attitude, a jurisdiction can grade sexual offenses as
between “rape” and “attempted rape,” depending upon whether or
not victims suffer a certain harm that we have not yet discussed -namely, primary harm that all rape statutes seek to prevent,
regardless of their form. To identify that primary harm, consider
the dignitary and primary harms underlying the offenses of
“destruction of property” and “murder,” respectively. An actor
who maliciously destroys another’s property inflicts a dignitary
harm upon him, i.e., the dignitary harm of manifesting contempt
for his victim’s legitimate interest in possessing and enjoying his
property. By the same token, an actor who murders inflicts a
dignitary harm on his victim, i.e., the dignitary harm of
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manifesting contempt for another’s life. However, the dignitary
harm of murder is considerably greater than the dignitary harm of
destruction of property because the primary harm that murder
statutes seek to prevent, i.e., loss of life, is so much greater than the
primary harm that destruction-of-property statutes seek to prevent,
i.e., preserving property. The two dignitary harms differ in
magnitude because, as dignitary harms, they are derivative of
primary harms that themselves differ in magnitude.
Mark’s partner and Susan’s boyfriend both inflict the same
dignitary harm on their victims, i.e., the dignitary harm of
manifesting disregard for their victims’ sexual autonomy. The
dignitary harm Mark’s partner and Susan’s boyfriend inflict is
commonly regarded to be less than the dignitary harm of murder
and, yet, greater than the dignitary harm of malicious destruction
of property; because the primary harm that rape statutes seek to
prevent is commonly regarded as being a harm that is less than loss
of life and, yet, greater than loss of property. What, then, is the
primary harm that rape statutes seek to prevent? It is harm that
Susan’s boyfriend and Mark’s partner both thought they were
inflicting but only Susan’s boyfriend succeeded in inflicting. It is
the harm a woman suffers when she is subjected to sexual
intercourse without her having subjectively chosen it for herself
under the conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom of
choice to which the jurisdiction at hand believes her to be entitled.
Because the latter harm is a function of a victim’s not having
subjectively chosen sexual intercourse in certain ways, the decision
to define consent as a subjective attitude is a decision to base the
crime of rape on the occurrence of that harm.
In sum, and contrary to what commentators claim, the
choice between defining consent as an attitude and defining it as an
expression is not a choice between defining it correctly and
defining wrongly. It is a policy choice that is is appropriate for
jurisdictions to make in their discretion. It is the choice between a
policy of grading the offense of rape on the basis of the occurrence
of the primary harm that all rape statutes seek to prevent, or the
policy of defining the offense solely in terms of dignitary harms.
The criminal law is rife with statutes based upon such policies.
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“Murder” is an offense that is predicated on the occurrence of the
primary harm that all homicide statutes seek to prevent , i.e., loss
of life. Thus, as among two actors who do everything they can to
wrongfully kill, one of whom succeeds and the other of whom
fails, only the actor who succeeds is guilty of murder, the other one
being at most guilty of attempted murder. In contrast, “larceny” is
an offense that is defined solely in terms of the dignitary harm that
an actor inflicts by manifesting willingness to “take” and
permanently “carry away” the property of another. Thus, as
between two actors who both do everything they can to
permanently deprive another of his property, one of whom
succeeds and the other of whom fails, the offense of larceny is the
same, regardless of the fact that only one succeeds in inflicting the
primary harm that larceny statutes seek to prevent. The difference
between defining consent as an attitude and defining it as an
expression is the difference between modeling the offense of rape
on murder or modeling it on larceny.
III. CONFUSING FEATURES OF FACTUAL CONSENT WITH FEATURES
OF PRESCRIPTIVE CONSENT
Factual consent and prescriptive consent share a feature
in common: they both consist, in whole or in part, of something
that is empirical in nature, namely, instances of actual consent. A
person actually consents to sexual intercourse (whether in mind,
word, or deed) when he actually chooses sexual intercourse
(whether in mind, word or deed) as that which she unconditionally
desires for herself, as that which she prefers for herself under the
circumstances in which she believes herself to be, or as that about
which she is sufficiently indifferent to it as to be willing to leave
its occurrence to others. Actual consent is empirical in nature
because it is a question of fact, not a question of policy, whether a
person has actually made such a choice for herself.
The difference between factual consent and prescriptive
consent is that while factual consent is constituted by instances of
actual consent, prescriptive consent merely includes instances of
actual consent. To prescriptively consent to sexual intercourse, a
woman must actually consent to it, to be sure. But she must also
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do something else that is normative in nature: she must actually
consent to it under such conditions of competence, knowledge, and
freedom that the jurisdiction at hand deems normatively sufficient
to justify leaving the matter to her.
Courts and commentators commonly approach contested
issues of prescriptive consent as if they consisted solely of
empirical issues characteristic of factual consent. I will address
two such confusions in this section: (A) confusions regarding the
relationship of prescriptive consent to “resistance;” and (B)
confusions regarding the relationship between prescriptive consent
and “force.”
A. Prescriptive Consent and “Resistance”
Courts and commentators like to tell a certain story about
the role of resistance in rape cases. The story goes something like
this:
A Commonplace Tale about Resistance
In the old days, the law required as a condition for
convicting men of rape that women “resist to the utmost,”
even to the point of death or grievous bodily injury.
Resistance requirements are based upon men’s fears that
women will consent to sexual intercourse or, at least,
appear to consent, and yet later maintain that they didn’t;
and, therefore, resistance requirements are designed to
provide objective evidence to actors and courts that who
claim not to have consented were telling the truth. The
rape reform movement of the 1970s, in the name of taking
women at their word, set out to eradicate resistance
requirements, and it largely succeeded. Although some
jurisdictions still retain mild forms of resistance
requirements, the utmost resistance rule has been
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abolished everywhere, and jurisdictions are more and
more abolishing resistance requirements altogether.14
The “Commonplace Tale” is widespread, and yet every part
of it is false. No Anglo-American jurisdiction has ever required, as
a condition for a man’s being guilty of rape, that a woman resist to
the point of death or grievous bodily injury.
Resistance
requirements are not evidentiary rules designed to provide
evidence to actors and courts that women who claim not to have
consented are telling the truth. The utmost-resistance requirement
has not been abolished, nor could it sensibly be abolished. No
jurisdiction has truly eliminated resistance requirements, nor could
any jurisdiction do so.
The fallacies of the “Commonplace Tale” are not normative
in origin -- that is, they are not the consequence of certain
normative views as to what counts, or ought to count, as rape. One
can possess all the normative views of those who tell the Tale

14

See, e.g., Joan McGregor, “Why When She Says No She Doesn’t
Mean Maybe and Doesn’t Mean Yes,” Legal Theory, vol. 2, 185-208, at. 177
(“Historically, rape was defined as ‘carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and
against her will’. . . . The result was that to prove ‘forcibly’ and ‘against her
will’, the courts . . . required victim resistance, expressed first as ‘utmost
resistance’. This requirement reflected the view that it was better for a woman
to die than be ‘dishonored’.”); Robin West, “A Comment on Consent, Sex, and
Rape,” Legal Theory, vol. 2, pp. 233-51, p. 237 (“To be a rape victim, one had
to be so vigilant about protecting one’s honor that one would truly fight to the
death to protect it.”). See also Michelle Anderson, “Reviving Resistance in
Rape Law,” 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 953, 957, 960, 968 (1998); Susan Estrich,
“Rape,” 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1101, 1131 (1986); Susan Schwartz, “An Argument
for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement from the Definition of
Forcible Rape,” 16 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 567, 569-570 (1983); Comment,
“Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape,” 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 613, 626
(1976); Note, “The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation,” 18 Stan. L. Rev.
680, 689 (1966); Note, “The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist
View,” 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 335, 346 (1973). People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284,
295-96, 301, 721 P.2d 110, 117, 120 ,228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 234-35, 239 (1986); In
the Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992).
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without committing its fallacies.
Rather, the fallacies are
conceptual in origin. They are the product of misunderstanding the
relationship between actual consent to sexual intercourse, on the
one hand, and the various kinds of freedom that jurisdictions may
require to transform such actual consent into prescriptive consent
to sexual intercourse, on the other.
Requirements and prohibitions of resistance are both
inherent in the freedoms that jurisdictions prescribe to transform
actual consent into prescriptive consent. There are two mutuallyexclusive kinds of wrongful force by which actors subject women
to sexual intercourse against their will: (1) overwhelming physical
strength; and (2) threats. An actor achieves sexual intercourse by
means of “overwhelming physical strength” when, like a collegiate
wrestler, he uses superior muscle power and physical adroitness to
subdue his counterpart, despite her doing everything she physically
can to prevent it -- the difference, of course, being that collegiate
wrestlers welcome the risk of being pinned to the mat despite their
doing everything they can within the rules to prevent it, while
women typically do not welcome being subdued and sexually
penetrated despite their doing everything they physically can to
prevent it. It is characteristic of overwhelming physical strength
that when actors use it to achieve sexual intercourse, they do so
without enlisting acts of will or cooperation on the part of their
sexual partners. In contrast, when an actor achieves sexual
intercourse by means of threats, he does so precisely by actively
enlisting the will or cooperation of his victim. Rather than
subduing her by means of overwhelming physical strength, he
induces her to submit by confronting her with an alternative that is
sufficiently grim in her eyes as to induce her to submit to sexual
intercourse rather than face it.
Every jurisdiction makes it an offense to elicit sexual
intercourse by means of overwhelming physical strength, at least in
cases in which the woman does not welcome the risk of being
forcibly subdued and penetrated. Every jurisdiction also makes it
an offense to elicit sexual intercourse by means of certain threats,
though jurisdictions differ as to the kinds of threats they prohibit as
means for eliciting sexual intercourse. Thus, all jurisdictions
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prohibit threats of death, grievous bodily injury, or extreme pain;
some jurisdictions go further and prohibit threats of any bodily
injury; some go even further and prohibit threats that would
“prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution.”15 Yet no
jurisdiction goes so far as to make it a crime to induce a woman to
submit to sexual intercourse by threatening, say, to destroy a
bauble of hers of trivial value or to stop inviting her to social
events.
Requirements that a woman resist an actor’s pressure on
her to submit to sexual intercourse – and, indeed, that a woman
resist to the utmost – are logically corollaries of statutory regimes
in which an actor is guilty of sexual intercourse by means of force
if, and only if, he induces a woman to submit by means of
overwhelming physical strength or wrongful threats. To illustrate,
suppose that a jurisdiction makes it an offense to elicit sexual
intercourse by means of (i) overwhelming physical strength, or (ii)
threats of death, bodily harm, extreme pain, or overwhelming
physical strength. Suppose further that the following three cases
arise:
The Wrestler. A 280-lbs. wrestler, whom Megan used to
date and who Megan believes would never beat her or badly hurt
her, suddenly pins her to the ground and, while using his superior
weight and strength to hold her down, sexually penetrates her,
despite her drawing upon every ounce of her strength to push him
off.
The Threatener. A next-door neighbor of Rachel drops by
to borrow sugar and, while there, suddenly grabs Rachel by the
arm and, holding his face close to hers, threatens to “beat the shit”
out of her unless she performs fellatio on him. Rachel pleads with
him to let her alone, but when he grabs a rolling pin as if to hit her,
she reluctantly submits, feeling she has no other alternative to
being badly beaten or killed.
15

Model Penal Code § 213.1(2)(a).
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The Manipulator. A young man is making out with his
girlfriend, Lisa, in her college dorm room when he starts to pull
down her underwear in order to have intercourse with her. Lisa
pushes his hand away several times, but she eventually desists and
reluctantly lets him have his way because she is afraid that if she
persists, he may give her slap across the face, curse her, and stomp
out the way he did the last time.
Megan, in her tussle with the wrestler, resisted to the
utmost and became a victim of what the statute defines as “rape.”
In actuality, however, the relationship between Megan's resistance
and her becoming a victim of rape under the statute is stronger than
that. Megan was a victim of what the statute defines as rape
because she resisted to the utmost: she was a victim of rape under
the statute because her assailant resorted to a kind of force, i.e.,
overwhelming physical strength, that is defined as the muscle
power and physical adroitness needed to overcome all a woman is
physically able to do to thwart sexual intercourse. In contrast, if
like Megan (like Lisa) had refrained from doing all she could to
thwart her partner -- that is, if Megan had not resisted to the utmost
but had submitted because of fear of the alternatives -- Megan
would not have been a victim of rape by means of overwhelming
physical strength because she would not have been someone of
whom it could be said, “She did everything she physically could to
thwart him, but he overwhelmed her with superior muscle power.”
She would at most have been a victim of rape by means of
wrongful threats.
Rachel, in dealing with her neighbor’s wrongful threats,
was also a victim of what the statute defines as rape without having
resisted. In actuality, however, the relationship between Rachel's
non-resistance and her being a victim of what the statute defines as
rape is stronger than that. In so far as the statute makes it a crime
to elicit sexual intercourse from a woman by threatening her with
death or grievous bodily injury, the statute does not require, and,
logically, it cannot require, that Rachel resist, because by
resisting, she would bring upon herself the very thing the statute
says she does not have to suffer as a consequence of refusing to
submit to sexual intercourse -- namely, death or grievous bodily
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injury. In contrast, if Rachel (like Lisa) had not feared death or
grievous bodily injury at her partner’s hands -- that is, if Rachel
had submitted to sexual intercourse because of a fear of something
else such as being given a slap across the face or cursed -- she
would have not have been a victim of what the statute defines as
rape. She would not have been a victim of what the statute defines
as rape because she had an option by which she could have
escaped both sexual intercourse and the alternatives of death,
grievous bodily injury, extreme pain and the application of
overwhelming physical strength from which the statute seeks
protects her -- namely, the option of taking the consequences of
being given a slap and cursed. In that respect, the statute does two
things: (1) it negates one species of resistance requirement, i.e.,
the supposed requirement that a woman resist at the cost of death,
grievous bodily injury, extreme pain, or the application of
overwhelming physical strength; and (2) it contains another species
of resistance requirement, i.e., the requirement that before a
woman will be heard to allege rape, she must resort to options she
believes she possesses by which she can avoid both sexual
intercourse and the alternative consequences from which the
statute seeks to protect her.
To be sure, one can rightly criticize a rape statute that fails
to protect women like Lisa who submit to sexual intercourse for
fear of being given a slap. But it is misleading to frame the
criticism as a grievance about “resistance” requirements
themselves because it is not a grievance about resistance
requirements in general. It is a grievance about the particular way
in which the statute defines wrongful threats and, hence, a
particular resistance requirement. It cannot be a grievance about
resistance requirements in general because resistance requirements
are corollaries of wrongful threats. To illustrate, suppose that the
statute is amended to make it an offense to elicit sexual intercourse
by threats of death, grievous bodily injury, the application of
overwhelming physical strength or moderate pain, including the
pain of being slapped. Suppose, too, that the following event
arises:
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The Curser. Stella is making out with her boyfriend when
he starts to pull down her underwear in order to have intercourse
with her. Stella pushes his hand away several times, but she
eventually desists and reluctantly lets him have his way because,
though she knows he would never strike her, she is afraid that if
she persists, he may curse her and stomp out the way he did the
last time.
Stella is not a victim of rape under the statute, because
although the statute has eliminated one resistance requirement, it
has retained another. The statute has eliminated the rule that
before a woman will be heard to allege rape, she must resist and
put up with being slapped if she believes that by doing so, she can
simultaneously avoid both sexual intercourse and the alternatives
from which the statute seeks to protect her. But the statute has
retained the rule that before a woman will be heard to allege rape,
she must resist and put up with being cursed, if she believes that by
doing so she will be able to simultaneously avoid both sexual
intercourse and the alternatives from which the statute seeks to
protect her.
Now it might be thought that a rule to the effect that “No
means no” would change this, but it wouldn’t. Analytically, “No
means no” is just another rule, albeit in prophylactic form, that
makes it a crime to elicit sexual intercourse by means of certain
threats; and, hence, like all such rules, “No means no” does not
require some kinds of resistance on a woman’s part and, yet, does
require others. “No means no” makes it a crime to elicit sexual
intercourse from a woman either while she is saying “no” or after
she says “no,” unless and until she changes her mind. As such,
“No means no” implicitly makes it a crime to elicit sexual
intercourse from a woman by implicitly threatening her with
having to do anything beyond saying “no” to avoid it. It follows,
therefore, that a woman who says “no” and does not change her
mind is not required to mount any further resistance as a condition
for convicting a man who thereafter has sexual intercourse with
her. Yet it also follows that a woman is not a victim of rape under
the rule unless she at least mounts the resistance of saying “no,”
because by saying “no,” she can simultaneously avoid both sexual
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intercourse and the threats from which the statute prophylactically
seeks to protect her.
B. Prescriptive Consent and “Force”
Courts and commentators are also confused about the
conceptual relationship between prescriptive consent and force.
To introduce the confusion, let us return for a moment to the
Commonplace Tale. I have discussed most of the fallacious claims
that constitute the Commonplace Tale, but I have not yet addressed
the claim that resistance rules are evidentiary rather than
substantive in nature. The latter is the claim that, rather than
altering the substantive meaning of “consent,” resistance rules are
designed to maintain existing definitions of consent while
providing evidence to actors and courts that women who claim not
to have consented are telling the truth.
We have seen that, contrary to the Commonplace Tale,
resistance requirements are, indeed, substantive in nature because
they are substantive correlatives of substantive definitions of
overwhelming physical strength and wrongful threats. Why, then,
do courts and commentators maintain the opposite? The answer, I
think, is that they are conceptually confused about prescriptive
consent in cases in which a woman feels coerced by the pressure of
circumstances to acquiesce to sexual intercourse. Courts and
commentators mistakenly think that whether a woman
prescriptively consents to sexual intercourse under the pressure of
circumstances is a question of what she really wants under the
circumstances.16 They then reason that women who resist sexual
intercourse do not really want to engage in it. Having thus
concluded that women who resist sexual intercourse do not
prescriptively consent to it, they, therefore, conclude that when
jurisdictions require resistance, jurisdictions must be requiring

16

See Joshua Dressler, “Where We Have Been, And Where We Might
Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections On Rape Law Reform,” Cleveland
State Law Review, vol. 46, 409-422, at 429 (1998)(“the bottom line’ in rape
cases is, ‘Did the female want the intimacy to occur at this time or not?’”).
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resistance for evidentiary reasons that are independent of women’s
non-consent.
The mistake which courts and commentators make is in
thinking that, with respect to women who feel coerced to acquiesce
to sexual intercourse, prescriptive consent is a function of what the
women really want. It is a mistake because, when a woman
reluctantly acquiesces to sexual intercourse under the pressure of
circumstances, she typically wants two things: she really wants to
engage in sexual intercourse because she really prefers the sexual
intercourse to the alternatives she believes she would otherwise
face if she refused (otherwise she would not be acquiescing) ; and,
yet at the same time, the woman really does not want to engage in
sexual intercourse because she would not be acquiescing were the
pressure of circumstances not what they are. The controlling issue
in such cases, therefore, is not a factual question as to whether the
women really want to have sex when they acquiesce under the
pressure of circumstances – because they both do and don’t -- but a
normative question as to whether in choosing sexual intercourse
for themselves, they do so with the freedom the statute at hand
regards as sufficient to leave the decision to them. Once one
answers the latter question, one also knows what kinds of
resistance they are and are not required to mount.
To illustrate, recall Stella who felt forced to go along with
her boyfriend’s desire for sexual intercourse rather than be cursed.
Did Stella really want to have sexual intercourse with her
boyfriend? She did and she didn’t. She didn’t want to have sexual
intercourse with her boyfriend when she was pushing his hands
away from her underwear, because at that moment, she preferred
physical resistance to sexual intercourse. Nor did she want it at the
very moment of sexual intercourse, because she would not have
gone along with him then if she hadn’t been afraid of being cursed.
Yet she also did want it at the very moment of sexual intercourse,
because at that moment she preferred sexual intercourse to the
alternative of being cursed. The legally-interesting question in
Stella’s case is not whether she actually consented to sexual
intercourse in the context of feeling coerced -- because, given that
she decided to submit, she clearly did -- but whether she
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prescriptively consented. The answer to the latter question has
nothing to do with what Stella was thinking or what she expressed
herself to be thinking. It has to do with the kinds of freedom the
jurisdiction at hand believes women ought to possess for purposes
of their sexual integrity.
Conceptual mistakes about prescriptive consent and force
are not confined to isolated discussions of resistance. They arise
whenever authorities discuss the most basic terms for defining
rape. Authorities differ widely on how “rape” ought to be defined.
Thus, some commentators and states take the position that rape
ought to be defined in terms of “non-consent” rather than
“force.”17 Others take the contrary position that rape ought to be
defined in terms of “force” rather than not “non-consent.”18 And
still other commentators take the position that rape ought to be

17

For states that define rape in terms of non-consent rather than force,
see Utah Code § 76-5-402 (2001); Kansas Statutes § 21-3502 (2000); Montana
Code § 45-5-502(1) (1995); Wisconsin Statutes § 940.225 (2000). For
commentators who argue that rape should be defined in terms of non-consent
rather than force, see Susan Estrich, “Rape,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 95, pp.
1087-1184., at 1095-96, 1132-33 (1986); Stephen Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex:
Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law 11, 32-33
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Lynne Henderson, “Rape
and Responsibility,” Law & Philosophy, vol. 11, nos. 1-2, pp. 127-78, at 158
(1992).
18
For states that define rape in terms of force rather than non-consent,
see, e.g., Arkansas Compiled Acts § 5-14-103L(a)(3) (2001)(‘compulsion’);
District of Columbia Code § 22-4102(1)-(2) (2001); Idaho Code § 18-6101(3)
(2001)(‘force or violence’); Indiana Code § 35-42-4-1 (2001); New Jersey
Statutes § 2C:14-2c(1) (2001)(‘physical force or coercion’); Ohio Code §
2907.02(2) (2001); Oklahoma Statutes, tit. 21, § 1111(3) (2000); South Dakota
Codified Laws § 22-22-1(2) (2001). For commentators who argue that rape
should be defined in terms of force rather than non-consent, see Catharine
MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State,” Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 635-658, pp. 650, 655 (1983);
Catharine MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State 245 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988)(arguing that"rape should be defined as
sex by compulsion, of which physical force is one form"); Robin West,
“Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Rape,” Columbia Law Review,
vol. 93, p. 1442-59, at1459 (1993).
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defined in terms of “non-consent” or “force.”19 I believe that this
debate is a manifestation of conceptual confusion. Any criminal
regulation of rape that is presently stated in terms of “non-consent”
can be stated interchangeably in terms of “force,” and vice versa,
though stating it in terms of “non-consent” is conceptually less
circuitous. Rather than support the entirety of the foregoing
assertion, however, I will focus here on a selection of claims that
are sometimes made to the contrary.
Consider first the argument that defining rape in terms of
“force” is normatively deficient. Robin West states the argument
in representative fashion, using the example of a professor who
pressures a student into sexual intercourse by threatening the
student with an undeserved low grade:
[Consider] sex that is concededly nonconsensual, but is not
(at least in any of the most obvious ways) forced. [W]hatever falls
into this category is, according to still-standard definitions of rape
found in most states’ rape law, fully legal. . . . [One example] is
sex obtained through some sort of coercion. . . . A woman who has
sex with a professor in order to guarantee that she will receive the
grade she earned in his course has been coerced into sex, which
again may concededly be nonconsensual, but she has not been
forced, and was therefore not raped.20
The core of West’s argument lies in what West means in
saying that the hypothetical student’s decision to submit to sex
with her professor can be “conceded” to be nonconsensual. West
means that although the student made a deliberate decision to
submit to sexual intercourse, her submission can be “conceded” to
be something she did not really want, in that she would have

19

For a state that defines rape in terms of non-consent or force, see
Iowa Code § 709.1(1) (1999)(‘Any sex act between persons is sexual abuse by
either of the persons when the act is performed with the other person in any of
the following circumstances. The act is done by force or against the will of the
other’). For commentator who argue that rape ought to be defined in terms of
non-consent or force, see McGregor, “Why When She Says No,” pp. 189-203;
West, “A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape,” pp. 243-46.
20
West, “A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape,” p. 239-40.
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refused it if she had not been threatened with an unfair grade. The
fallacy in the argument is the assumption that the student’s
counterfactual wishes, i.e., what she would have chosen if the
circumstances as she wished they had been, control whether she
legally consented to doing what she deliberately did. The
counterfactual wishes of a person who actually chooses sexual
intercourse as the best she can do for herself under the
circumstances -- and who does so under conditions of freedom that
the jurisdiction at hand regards as sufficient to enable her to take
responsibility for her choice -- are wholly immaterial. What
matters is that she actually chooses sexual intercourse under
conditions that the jurisdiction at hand regards as free of wrongful
force. That is what prescriptive consent to sexual intercourse is.
To be sure, perhaps jurisdictions should treat threats such
as the professor’s as instances of wrongful “force” for purposes of
sexual assault.21 If they do, sexual intercourse induced by such
threats becomes intercourse both by wrongful force and without
legal consent. If they do not, however, sexual intercourse remains
intercourse without wrongful force and thus with legal consent.
For, again, that is what it means for a person to prescriptively
consent to sexual intercourse in the context of unwanted pressure:
it means she deliberately submitted to sexual intercourse as a result
of pressures that she wishes were not present but that the
jurisdiction does not regard as wrongful means for inducing
acquiescence to sexual intercourse. Contrary to what West
maintains, one cannot meaningfully say of a person who
reluctantly acquiesces to sexual intercourse in the face of unwanted
pressures, “She is not a victim of sexual intercourse by wrongful
force, but she is a victim of sexual intercourse without prescriptive
consent.”22

21

See Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex, p. 197.
For courts that commit this fallacy, see North Carolina v. Alston,
310 N.C. 399, 408, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475-76 (1984)(dictum); Regina v. Olugboja,
[1982] 1 QB 320. To be sure, it is not contradiction for a court to grade sexual
offenses by defining a more serious offense as sexual intercourse by force and
without prescriptive consent, while defining the lesser as sexual intercourse
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Now consider the contrary argument that defining rape in
terms of “non-consent” is normatively deficient. Catharine
MacKinnon and Robin West both argue that an actor’s mere use of
force to achieve sexual intercourse ought to render him guilty of
rape, regardless of whether the woman consents to the
intercourse.23 This criticism comes in two distinct forms, but both
rest on a common fallacy– the fallacy that defining rape solely in
terms of non-consent fails to protect women from pressures from
which they ought to be free. West argues that in so far as consent
is a defense to sexual intercourse by means of force, it exonerates
an actor who so frightens his victim with threats of death or
mayhem that she fearfully “consents” to sexual intercourse rather
than risk being killed:
[T]he recent and notorious Texas case, in which a woman
was found to have consented to sex with a man who held a knife at
her throat because she pleaded with him to use a condom to avoid
the risk of AIDS, was such a case: There was undeniable force,
but her rational, articulated attempt to minimize harm to herself
demonstrated her desire to acquiesce, rather than risk great harm
by fighting, and hence demonstrated her consent.24
Unfortunately, West makes the same legal mistake as the
Austin, Texas, grand jury whose refusal to indict the “condom
rapist” was later overturned: West erroneously assumes that when
a jurisdiction makes it a criminal offense to have sexual intercourse
by without “consent,” the jurisdiction is using “consent” to refer to
actual consent, regardless of the threats by which it is elicited. In
reality, when jurisdictions make it a crime, without more, to have
sexual intercourse without “consent,” they are using “consent” in a
legal sense to refer to something she does or experiences -without prescriptive consent alone, provided that it is understood that the force
that is needed to taint consent for purposes of the higher offense (say, threats of
physical harm) is different from the lesser force that may suffice to taint consent
for lesser offenses (say, force that overcomes a “no”). See 18 Pennsylvania
Compiled Statutes §§ 3121, 3124.1 (2001).
23
See MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State, p. 245;
West, “A Comment on Consent, Sex, and the Law,” p. 244.
24
West, “A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape,” p. 238.
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including actually choosing sexual intercourse for herself -- that
occurs under such conditions as the jurisdiction deems sufficient
for the sexual intercourse not to be a wrong to her. Otherwise,
they would be taking the unprecedented position that an actor who
beats and maims a woman until she yields, saying, “Just do what
you want, but please don’t hurt me any more,” commits no sexual
offense.
MacKinnon’s argument against consent is more substantial.
MacKinnon argues that in so far as consent is a defense to
pressures to engage in sexual intercourse, consent legitimates a
“sado-masochistic” model of sexual intercourse.25 MacKinnon
believes that by making “consent” a defense, the law legitimates
sexual intercourse that is the product of social, economic, and
political pressures that cause women to choose sexual intercourse
when it is contrary to their interests and, worse yet, to cause
women to regard the accompanying pressures as acceptable and
even desirable.26 The fallacy in this argument does not lie in
MacKinnon’s conception of the conditions under which women
choose sexual intercourse. Rather, it lies in her conception of legal
consent. Suppose for a moment that MacKinnon convinces
lawmakers that they ought to protect women from certain pressures
to engage in sexual intercourse that women are now socialized to
regard as acceptable and even desirable. Suppose, further, that
lawmakers wish to codify that protection in a traditional way--that
is, by prohibiting actors from subjecting women to sexual
intercourse without their “consent.” There is nothing in the nature
of prescriptive consent that prevents lawmakers from doing so. On
the contrary, in order to prescriptively consent, a woman’s
acquiescence to sexual intercourse must be sufficiently free,
informed, and competent to enable her to take responsibility in the
eyes of the law for her choice. A woman’s choice is not “free” if it
is the product of pressures that, in the judgment of the jurisdiction
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See MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State, p.172
See Catharine MacKinnon, Sex Equality: Rape 769, 779, 817-18,
839-40, 885-87 (New York: Foundation Press, 2001).
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at hand, unconditionally taint it, that is, pressures that taint her
choice even in the event that she welcomes them.27
To be sure, MacKinnon realizes that jurisdictions today
refuse to treat general social pressures on women as sufficient to
invalidate the sexual acquiescence of women who welcome the
pressures. However, that is a feature not of the concept of consent
itself, but of the particular conceptions of consent that jurisdictions
currently embrace. No legal change can be won under any banner–
whether under the banner of “force” or “non-consent”--without
first persuading jurisdictions to alter their understanding of the
kinds of pressure on women that are wrongful. Once a jurisdiction
is persuaded to change its norms, the norms can be fully codified
in terms of consent.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the meaning of consent in rape cases is both
difficult and preliminary. Like all analysis, analysis of consent is
difficult because the very categories of thought that we bring to
bear in analyzing our confusions are themselves the source of our
confusions. Yet such analysis is also preliminary because it is
itself a tool in service of the central task of determining when
sexual intercourse is, and when it is not, a wrong from which
women should be protected.
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